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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3757 
_____________ 
BILLY KERBIN CALDERON-ARGUMEDO, 
AKA Jorge Vasquez,  
Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
______________ 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
Of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
Agency No. A098-617-432 
(Immigration Judge: Daniel A. Morris) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: September 15, 2017) 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________________
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Billy Kerbin Calderon Argumedo1 petitions for review of a ruling by the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Because Petitioner refers to himself as “Billy Calderon” in his brief, we use his 
preferred surname here. 
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Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s decision 
denying his request for protection under the United Nations’ Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).2  Because we find that substantial record evidence supports the agency’s 
determination that Calderon did not meet his burden of proof for CAT protection, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
Calderon is a 32-year-old man originally from El Salvador.  He first entered the 
United States in 2000, when he was 15 years old.  While in high school in Virginia, 
Calderon became affiliated with the MS-13 gang, which also exists in El Salvador.  In 
2005, Calderon was arrested and charged with automobile theft.3   
In 2006, Calderon was removed to El Salvador.  He reentered the United States in 
August 2008, and later became an Evangelical Christian.  In 2013, he was apprehended 
and placed in immigration detention.  During his detention, an asylum officer conducted 
a reasonable fear interview, and found no reasonable fear of persecution or torture.  
Calderon appealed this finding, and the Department of Homeland Security referred his 
case to an Immigration Judge for withholding only proceedings.  In 2016, an IJ conducted 
the withholding only proceedings and (1) pretermitted Calderon’s application for 
withholding of removal based on the length of his sentence for automobile theft in 2005,4 
                                              
2 S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
3 While in DHS custody, Calderon was convinced to get an MS-13 tattoo placed across 
his chest. This tattoo is still visible today. 
 
4 This determination was not challenged in the BIA appeal, and is not challenged here. 
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and (2) denied Calderon’s application for deferral of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture, finding that Calderon could not make a particularized showing that he 
would be subjected to torture upon his return to El Salvador. The BIA affirmed, and 
Calderon now appeals his CAT denial. 
II.5 
Calderon presents two arguments on appeal: (1) the IJ and BIA erred in 
concluding that Calderon did not prove that the Salvadoran government acquiesces to 
torturous activity through the willful blindness of its public officials; and (2) Calderon 
provided sufficient evidence to prove that he would more likely than not be tortured upon 
return to El Salvador. We address each argument in turn. 
Calderon first argues that the IJ and BIA incorrectly denied his CAT claim 
because both applied an incorrect legal standard for determining whether he would be 
tortured “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”6 However, because the IJ and BIA 
based their decisions on Calderon’s inability to show that he was personally in danger of 
future torture by gangs in El Salvador, rather than determining whether the government’s 
                                              
5 We have jurisdiction to review the IJ and BIA’s decisions regarding Calderon’s 
application for deferral of removal and protection under the CAT. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a); 
Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2005) (where the BIA’s decision adopts 
or defers to portions of the IJ’s decision, we will review those aspects of the IJ’s decision 
as well). We review factual findings using the substantial evidence standard. Tarrawally 
v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).  
6 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).  
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action (or inaction) regarding gang violence rose to the level of acquiescence, the 
argument is meritless.  
When applying for protection under the CAT, “[t]he burden of proof is on the 
applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if 
removed to the proposed country of removal.”7 Both the IJ and BIA found that Calderon 
had failed to meet this burden, and that failure made Calderon ineligible for relief under 
the CAT.8 Thus, Calderon’s argument that the IJ and BIA improperly assessed the 
“acquiescence” prong of a CAT claim is irrelevant, because that is not why his claim 
failed before the IJ or BIA.9 
Calderon next argues that the IJ and BIA were incorrect in concluding that he 
could not show a likelihood of future torture because they improperly ignored the 
following evidence: (1) the Salvadoran government supports the killing of gang members 
as a “cleansing” of society; (2) the police are unwilling to help him despite his reports of 
the threats; (3) the MS-13 gang was able to locate Calderon despite his relocations to live 
with his girlfriend and relatives; (4) the MS-13 gang threatened to kill him and his 
                                              
7 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see also id. at § 208.17 (governing deferral of removal under the 
CAT). 
8 See, e.g., App. at 51 (“Here, the Court is not persuaded that the respondent will be 
personally at risk of torture if he is returned to his country.”); id. at 5 (“Based on the 
Immigration Judge’s properly found facts, we will affirm his conclusion that the 
applicant did not meet his heavy burden to show a likelihood of harm rising to the level 
of torture in El Salvador.”). 
9 Indeed, Calderon bases this argument on language from the portion of the IJ’s decision 
discussing Calderon’s application for withholding of removal, which was not appealed to 
either the BIA or this Court. See Petitioner Br. 18 (citing App. at 49). 
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family; (5) members of his family have already been killed or severely injured by gangs; 
and (6) he will now be targeted as a Christian if he returns to El Salvador, because the 
church leads the anti-gang movement in the country.  
 We review such factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.10 
Thus, the IJ and BIA’s determinations will only be overturned where “the evidence not 
only supports [reversal] but compels it.”11 When “assessing whether it is more likely than 
not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal,” a court 
should consider: 
(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; 
 
(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of 
removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; 
 
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the 
country of removal, where applicable; and 
 
(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of 
removal.12 
 
Finally, it is important to note that “the IJ and BIA need not ‘discuss every piece of 
evidence mentioned’” by an applicant seeking relief.13 
Here, it is undisputed that Calderon was not tortured in the past. The record also 
shows, as the BIA noted, that “while in El Salvador [from 2006-2008], [Calderon] 
                                              
10 Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We will sustain the BIA’s 
decision if substantial evidence in the record supports its decision.”). 
11 I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). 
12 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). 
13 Green v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Huang v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
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received numerous telephone calls from gang members telling him that he had to resume 
gang activities, but he was not harmed when he did not do so.”14 Similarly, Calderon 
“testified that gang members told him his family would be harmed or killed if he did not 
rejoin the gang, but his family remains in El Salvador unharmed.”15 Calderon also 
testified that his cousin’s murder and his brother’s shooting were unrelated to Calderon’s 
gang membership.16 After considering Calderon’s evidence, the IJ and BIA concluded 
that Calderon “has not shown that his fear of returning to El Salvador is supported by 
sufficient facts, rather than based upon speculation or assumptions regarding what might 
happen to him if he returns.”17 
We agree. Calderon submitted evidence that gangs in El Salvador are dangerous 
and harmful.  That is a proposition that cannot really be disputed. However, he did not 
submit evidence sufficient to compel (or even support) a finding that it would be more 
likely than not that he would personally be tortured if he were to return.  Thus, neither the 
IJ nor the BIA can be said to have ignored relevant record evidence that would have 
changed this conclusion. 
III.  
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Calderon’s petition for review of his final 
removal order. 
                                              
14 App. at 4. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 132–34. 
17 Id. at 51–52. 
